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I.    INTRODUCTION  
“The mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a 
public good of transcendent importance.”1  As Justice Stevens eloquently 
wrote in the majority opinion of Jaffee v. Redmond,2 mental health should be 
more than a mere afterthought when considering the health and well-being 
of society.  Mental and physical health intertwine in equal parts to form the 
overall well-being of a person; therefore, the two should be considered of 
equal importance.3  Unfortunately, historically speaking, the general 
population has all too often failed to recognize the importance of mental 
health.  This societal reluctance is still evident in professional circles today, 
particularly in the legal community.   
Lawyers occupy one of the most stressful and confrontational 
professional occupations.  Unlike other professions such as medicine, 
accounting, or engineering, where collaboration is essential to a successful 
result for all affected parties, the adversarial common law system pits lawyers 
against each other.4  In this zero-sum system, parties commit to zealously 
opposing equally qualified and trained colleagues.5  Some commentators 
 
1. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996).  
2. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
3. See id. at 11 (justifying the extension of psychotherapist-patient privilege through emphasis 
on its positive effects in providing for mental and emotional benefits to the general population). 
4. See ALEX WILSON ALBRIGHT & DUSTIN B. BENHAM, TEXAS COURTS: A SURVEY 2 (2018) 
(outlining the partisan and competitive nature of the American judicial system which seeks not so much 
the truth, but rather success through effective advocacy on the part of participating lawyers). 
5. Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33, 47–48 (2001) 
(describing the American adversarial legal system as a zero-sum game where there must be winners and 
losers between competing litigants). 
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traced the historical roots of the modern American legal system to the old 
English tradition of “trial by battle,” with lawyers representing litigants and 
serving as proverbial gladiators in the modern ring of the American 
courtroom.6  The constant strain placed upon lawyers in this professional 
environment commonly leads to mental fatigue and mental illness.  As 
studies reveal, lawyers are among the most susceptible in America to mental 
health issues.7   
Despite recent progress in addressing lawyers’ mental health, there 
remains an inherent tension between the legal profession’s concern with the 
mental health of practicing lawyers and a lawyer’s duty to advocate 
effectively on behalf of clients.  This tension is most prevalent in a lawyer’s 
duty to forgo or withdraw from representing clients where “the lawyer’s 
physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to 
represent the client,” as set forth in Rule 1.16(a)(2) of the American Bar 
Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct.8   
This Comment spurs critical discussion and consideration of the need to 
take progressive steps in combatting instances of mental illness in the legal 
profession through changing the way state disciplinary actions treat mental 
health.  The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct serve as the basis 
of this Comment’s analysis of how mental health conditions trigger 
professional duties for lawyers during client representation.9  Without 
question, many lawyers experience serious substance abuse and addictive 
dependence, but this Comment will focus on other equally serious mental 
health conditions that, to date, have not received as much attention in 
academic discourse.  Lawyers are increasingly recognized as struggling with 
 
6. See Jim Wilets & Areto A. Imoukhuede, A Critique of the Uniquely Adversarial Nature of the U.S. 
Legal, Economic and Political System and Its Implications for Reinforcing Existing Power Hierarchies, 20 U. PA. J.L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 341, 345 (2018) (drawing comparisons between the modern adversarial legal system 
and the feudal British legal system, “which incorporated a literal ‘trial by battle’ in its earliest genesis”). 
7. See Sarah Cearley, Lawyer Assistance Programs: Bridging the Gap, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 453, 456 (2014) (lamenting the professional environment of the adversarial legal profession which 
contributes to substantial physiological strains on attorneys’ mental health). 
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
9. See id. (detailing the mandatory duty to withdraw or forgo representation where a lawyer has 
a physical or mental health condition materially impairing her ability to represent her client). 
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general anxiety,10 major depression,11 and bipolar disorder.12  With 
increased awareness and sensitivity to the severe effects of mental health 
disorders, the implications of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) are liable to have an 
increased impact on the legal profession as lawyers who become aware of 
their mental health problems must cope with professional responsibilities 
owed to clients.13 
Some may argue state bar associations are well within their discretion to 
decide it is in the best interest of the profession to protect clients by 
imposing additional responsibilities on lawyers with mental health 
conditions such as depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder.  Indeed, they 
may rely on the long-held aphorism maintaining the practice of law is not a 
right but a privilege that rests within the province of the several states to 
regulate and control.14  However, in times gone by, leaders in the legal 
profession used these individualistic notions to justify preventing certain 
groups of people from entering the legal profession altogether.15   
The fact that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain provisions 
for disciplining attorneys with mental conditions due to the presence of the 
condition, under certain circumstances, might dissuade attorneys with 
mental health conditions from continuing practice.16  Thus, this Comment 
argues taking disciplinary action against lawyers with mental health 
 
10. See generally NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
GENERALIZED ANXIETY DISORDER: WHEN WORRY GETS OUT OF CONTROL (2016) [hereinafter 
NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, WHEN WORRY GETS OUT OF CONTROL] (describing the signs, 
symptoms, and treatment of generalized anxiety disorder). 
11. See generally NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
DEPRESSION: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW (2015) [hereinafter NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW] (explaining the signs, symptoms, and treatment of depression). 
12. See generally NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
BIPOLAR DISORDER (2018) [hereinafter NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, BIPOLAR DISORDER] 
(informing the public of the signs symptoms, and treatment of bipolar disorder). 
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (maintaining lawyers must seek to 
withdraw from representation when they know of a mental health impairment that would materially 
impair their representing a client’s interests).  
14. In re Lee, 806 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Ark. 1991) (“The practice of law is a privilege, not a matter 
of right.”).  
15. Cf. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 137, 139 (1872) (holding the right to practice law was 
not a privilege within the meaning of the United States Constitution, therefore permitting states to 
withhold law licenses from women).  
16. See In re Evans, 169 P.3d 1083, 1090 (Kan. 2007) (reaffirming the notion that a lawyer who 
engages in professional misconduct is subject to appropriate discipline); see also MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (providing lawyers with mental conditions are subject to discipline when the 
presence of their mental condition materially impairs their ability to represent their client). 
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conditions is not the best system to address incidents of lawyer mental 
health conditions if the profession is serious in its desire to combat these 
problems.  The inherent tension between an increased desire for lawyers to 
receive treatment for their mental health conditions and the possible 
sanctions imposed on lawyers practicing with these conditions is an idea ripe 
for reconsideration.  
Part II of this Comment will examine the historical development of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, emphasizing their relation to mental 
health.  Then it will shift into a discussion of the current trends in mental 
health within the legal community; a recent landmark study conducted 
among state Lawyer Assistance Programs will serve as a useful guide in this 
endeavor.  Part III will examine applicational problems in how Model 
Rule 1.16(a)(2) affects relevant groups of lawyers.  Part IV will offer possible 
revisions of the Model Rules to protect clients and the legal profession.    
This Comment concludes by acknowledging the great strides the legal 
profession has made in supporting lawyers with mental health conditions 
but will remain steadfast in emphasizing the need for even more support.  
Hopefully, this Comment prompts increased sensitivity in dealing with 
lawyers with mental health conditions.   
II.    BACKGROUND 
Conceptualizing mental health disorders is undoubtedly difficult for 
those without firsthand experience of the emotional and physical symptoms 
of conditions like anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder.  People 
unfamiliar with these mental health conditions may take the stereotypical 
symptoms associated with a depressive or anxiety disorder and attempt to 
rationalize the emotional aspects of these experiences.  It is not controversial 
to state nervousness and sadness—two key symptoms associated with these 
mental health conditions—are a normal part of life for most people.  
However, as medical research continues to improve, studies have discovered 
a wide range of psychological and psychosomatic symptoms attributable to 
depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder that might surprise those 
unimpaired by the daily added difficulties these symptoms and conditions 
impose on those suffering from these conditions.17 
 
17. Office of Law. Regulation v. Cotten (In re Cotten), 650 N.W.2d 551, 552–53 (Wis. 2002) 
(disciplining an attorney suffering from depression who, due to her condition, was prevented from 
answering phone calls, opening mail, and attending court hearings). 
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The symptoms of depression are characterized as persistent sadness, 
anxiety, or “empty mood”; constant feelings of hopelessness or pessimism; 
lingering feelings of guilt, worthlessness, or helplessness; loss of pleasure or 
interest in activities and hobbies; decreased energy, fatigue, or being “slowed 
down”; difficulty remembering, concentrating, or decision-making; changes 
in appetite and/or weight; thoughts of death, suicide, or suicide attempts; 
and restlessness or irritability.18  Those suffering from anxiety disorder may 
experience excessive worry about daily activities, trouble controlling feelings 
of worry or nervousness, constant restlessness, difficulty concentrating, 
being easily startled, insomnia, stomachache or other pains, trembling, 
twitching, difficulty swallowing, profuse sweating, light-headedness, and/or 
breathlessness.19  Bipolar disorder—formerly known as manic depressive 
disorder—causes an afflicted person to suffer periodic episodes of 
contrasting, extreme symptoms.20  The symptoms involved can be either 
manic or depressive, such as, respectively: elation and sadness, excitement 
and restlessness, hyperactive thoughts and inability to concentrate or make 
decisions, increased interest in pleasurable activities and a lack of interest in 
nearly all experiences.21  
A. Mental Health in the Legal Profession 
 Stress, a nearly ubiquitous concept in modern life, is one of the most 
common potential instigating factors in developing these mental 
disorders.22  In fact, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) found 
a common form of stress involves the stress experienced at work.23  A 
typical perception of those in the legal profession, and attorneys, specifically, 
casts them as among the most stressed, overworked, and mentally strained 
professionals.  These perceptions of the legal field validate the NIMH’s 
proposition when examining the sober realities of attorney mental health in 
the United States.  As mental health became a topic of greater significance 
towards the turn of the twentieth century, empirical studies of the rates of 
 
18. NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW, supra note 11. 
19. NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, WHEN WORRY GETS OUT OF CONTROL, supra 
note 10.  
20. NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, BIPOLAR DISORDER, supra note 12.  
21. Id. 
22. See NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
5 THINGS YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT STRESS (2019) (finding “[o]ver time, continued strain on your 
body from routine stress may contribute to serious health problems, such as heart disease, high blood 
pressure, diabetes, and other illnesses, as well as mental disorders like depression or anxiety”). 
23. Id. 
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depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, and other stress-related mental 
conditions among lawyers became an area of focus in the mid- to late-
1990s.24   
G. Andrew H. Benjamin, Elaine J. Darling, and Bruce Sales conducted 
one of these studies, using a sample of Washington lawyers during this time 
period.  The results of this study notably revealed higher rates of depression 
among lawyers compared to rates of depression present in the general 
population of Western industrialized countries.25  The surveyed lawyers 
reported suffering depression at a rate of 19%, easily surpassing the average 
rate of depression in the Western world, which ranged between 3% and 
9%.26 
Despite the serious findings implicit in these figures, a notable lull in the 
scientific study of the legal community’s mental health occurred in the 
decades following this study.  In 2015, however, the Hazelden Betty Ford 
Foundation, in conjunction with the American Bar Association Commission 
on Lawyer Assistance Programs, completed the most comprehensive study 
to date regarding the state of mental health among legal professionals.27  
Researchers gathered survey responses from fifteen state bar associations 
and the two largest counties of another state, resulting in a sample size of 
12,825 licensed, employed lawyers.28   
The Ford survey results reaffirmed the significant mental health struggles 
legal practitioners face.  Tested and measured using the Depression Anxiety 
Stress Scales-21 self-report system, 28.3% of surveyed lawyers reported 
experiencing mild to extremely severe depression, 19.2% had experienced 
 
24. See generally Connie J.A. Beck et al., Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related Problems and Other 
Psychological Concerns Among a Sample of Practicing Lawyers, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 1 (1995) (“[I]ncrease in 
employee assistance programs and professional associations that are now actively addressing 
psychological distress and providing confidential counselling and alcohol treatment for their members 
is a testament to the rising concern about these issues.”); G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Prevalence 
of Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers, 13 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 
233, 233 (1990) (“In recent years, the American Bar Association has begun to address the problems 
created by physical and psychological impairment of practicing lawyers.”); William W. Eaton et al., 
Occupations and the Prevalence of Major Depressive Disorder, 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1079, 1079 (1990) 
(describing a study from 1990 analyzing rates of depression across various occupations, with lawyers 
showing a significant elevation in depression rates). 
25. Benjamin et al., supra note 24, at 240–41. 
26. Id. 
27. See Patrick R. Krill et al., The Prevalence of Substance Use and Other Mental Health Concerns Among 
American Attorneys, 10 J. ADDICTION MED. 46, 46 (2016) (indicating researchers conducted the study 
in order to increase the amount of data in the area of mental health in the legal community).  
28. Id. at 47. 
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mild to severe anxiety, and 22.7% had experienced mild to severe levels of 
stress; bipolar disorder was not a measured outcome on this exam.29  The 
survey revealed a piece of data perhaps even more striking when it directly 
questioned respondents about their personal mental health struggles 
throughout their legal careers.  Of the lawyers surveyed, 61.1% indicated 
they had dealt with anxiety, 45.7% indicated they had experienced 
depression, and 2.4% indicated they had dealt with bipolar disorder at some 
point during their career.30   
The dearth of scientific studies in the early- to mid-1990s was confronted 
by state bar associations’ effort to track statistics of lawyer mental health 
conditions in the landmark 2015 Ford survey.31  Additionally, Lawyer 
Assistance Programs have significantly expanded since the 1960s.  Now 
these programs help lawyers with various issues, including substance abuse, 
addiction, mental health, mental illness, marriage, and finances.32  Their 
mission to aid lawyers in practicing law has expanded into the realm of 
mental health so as to combat instances of mental health conditions like 
depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder in the legal profession.   
To this end, in coordination with Lawyer Assistance Programs, the ABA 
has taken the initiative to ensure legal professionals gain access to available 
resources by forming the Commission on Lawyer Assistance Programs to 
examine the effectiveness and functioning of these programs.33  What 
started as irregular collections of information has, as of 2010, turned into a 
biannual survey conducted by the ABA with the willing participation of the 
various state Lawyer Assistance Programs.34  In 2012, Lawyer Assistance 
Programs reported opening files related to mental health impairments at the 
following rates: 41% depression, 23% anxiety, and 6% bipolar disorder.35  
These figures demonstrate many lawyers who request assistance from 
Lawyer Assistance Programs are seeking to address these mental health 
conditions.  This tacit acknowledgement proves significant when 
 
29. Id. at 49–50. 
30. Id. at 50. 
31. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  
32. Cearley, supra note 7, at 453.  
33. ABA COMM’N ON LAW. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, 2010 COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF 
LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 5 (2011). 
34. Id.; see Terry L. Harrell, Foreword to ABA COMM’N ON LAW. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, 2014 
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (2015) (indicating the ABA 
conducted the survey in 2010, 2012, and 2014). 
35. ABA COMM’N ON LAW. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, 2012 COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF 
LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 20–21 (2013). 
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considering disciplining these lawyers for practicing with these mental health 
conditions.36   
Comparing the results of these recent studies further demonstrates the 
steadily increasing plight of lawyers with mental health issues.  From 2012 
to 2014, survey reports of files opened for anxiety and bipolar disorder 
remained relatively constant at 21% for anxiety and 4% for bipolar disorder 
in 2014, and 23% for anxiety and 6% for bipolar disorder in 2012.37  
However, figures regarding depression notably surged from 2012 to 2014, 
with cases increasing from 41% to 50%.38  The foregoing discussion reveals 
the notable impact mental health issues pose on the legal profession, an 
increased awareness within the profession, and steps the profession has 
taken to understand what the increase in mental health issues among 
practicing lawyers means for the profession as a whole.   
As awareness and understanding of lawyers’ mental health issues has 
increased, so too has the desire to connect afflicted lawyers with the vast 
array of resources Lawyer Assistance Programs have developed in recent 
decades.39  The homepage of the website for Lawyer Assistance Programs 
emphasizes available avenues for struggling lawyers to seek help.40  Also, at 
least one jurisdiction has an independent trust set up for lawyers, judges, and 
law students to finance mental health treatment of all sorts.41  To this end, 
overriding policy considerations often make information shared in these 
 
36. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (indicating, to 
violate the Rule, a lawyer must knowingly represent a client while afflicted with a mental condition 
rendering the lawyer materially incapable of representing the client’s interests). 
37. 2014 COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 34, at 23; 
2012 COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 35, at 21. 
38. Compare 2014 COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra 
note 34, at 23 (examining figures from Lawyer Assistance Programs for the 2014 reporting cycle) with  
2012 COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 35, at 21 
(considering figures from Lawyer Assistance Programs for the 2012 reporting cycle). 
39. See generally Ann D. Foster, Assisting the Depressed Lawyer, 70 TEX. BAR J. 221, 223 (2007) 
(explaining the Texas Lawyers’ Assistance Program can assist lawyers who are suffering from mental 
health afflictions). 
40. See TEX LAWS.’ ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, https://www.tlaphelps.org/ [https://perma. 
cc/NKW5-42AE] (listing ways through which the Texas Lawyers’ Assistance Program tries to help 
attorneys with mental health struggles). 
41. See What We Do, THE SHEERAN-CROWLEY TR., https://www.sheerancrowley.org/what-
we-do [https://perma.cc/GV9G-N9AG] (explaining how the Sheeran-Crowley trust funds various 
forms of mental treatment for law students, lawyers, and judges). 
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programs confidential.42  This ostensibly signals a preference toward 
treatment rather than reporting and assessing punishment.   
Apart from servicing lawyers with mental illnesses, state Lawyer 
Assistance Programs have also increased attempts to dispel the myths and 
stigma surrounding mental health in the legal profession.43  The preceding 
testimony shows the newfound dedication state bars are devoting to lawyers 
facing mental health conditions like anxiety, depression, and bipolar 
disorder.   
As new generations of lawyers come of age in an era where mental health 
is less stigmatized, the need to discuss these issues is more acute given the 
higher rate young and inexperienced lawyers suffer from mental health 
conditions.44  Acceptance of the legitimacy of mental health conditions 
needs to keep pace with—or perhaps outrun—the increased rates of 
affliction in the legal profession.  Recognizing the ubiquity of mental health 
issues as a natural, controllable, and treatable characteristic inherent to the 
legal practice will hopefully increase focus on mental health in the legal 
profession going forward.   
B. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) 
Notwithstanding the great strides institutional concern has taken for 
lawyers’ mental health in the past few decades, inherent tension still exists 
between efforts to reduce the prevalence of mental health conditions among 
practicing lawyers and concerns regarding upholding the professional 
identity of the legal field.  The intersection between lawyer mental health 
and regulation of the legal profession is most prevalent in the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  Specifically, Model Rule 1.16(a)(2)—the 
mandatory withdrawal and refusal provision—implicates lawyers who 




42. Fred C. Zacharias, A Word of Caution for Lawyer Assistance Programming, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 237, 237 (2004); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) 
(relieving the duty for a lawyer to report knowledge of professional misconduct gained in the course 
of participating in a lawyer assistance program). 
43. See generally Foster, supra note 39, at 222 (providing examples of common myths about 
depression as well as actual facts). 
44. Cf. Krill et al., supra note 27, at 51 (“Furthermore, these mental health concerns manifested 
on a similar trajectory to alcohol use disorders, in that they generally decreased as both age and years 
in the field increased.”). 
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materially impair their ability to represent clients.45 
The ABA originally composed the Model Rules to serve as the definitive 
guide influencing professional conduct development for the bench and bar 
of lawyers throughout the United States.46  As principles of federalism 
meant the several states retained regulation of their state bars,47 this idea of 
providing a sense of uniformity in the area of ethics might have seemed to 
some a tall task.  The ABA proved successful to a degree; the current form 
of the Model Rules represents a culmination of the ABA’s efforts over the 
last century in the study, debate, and formation of these standards.48   
The 1908 Canons of Ethics represented the ABA’s first attempt at 
establishing a standard operating procedure relating to American lawyers’ 
professional conduct.49  The 1887 Code of Legal Ethics of the Alabama 
State Bar Association inspired the 1908 Canons, which itself sparked the 
creation and adoption of similar ethical codes among at least ten other state 
bar associations.50  With no major substantive changes, the ABA adopted 
the Alabama Code’s substance into canonical form with adjoining state 
 
45. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (providing the need to withdraw from 
representation where a lawyer knows they have a mental health condition that would materially impair 
the representation of the client). 
46. See Chair’s Introduction, A.B.A. (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_pr
ofessional_conduct_preface/chair_introduction/ [https://perma.cc/BNJ8-5FKB] (proclaiming 
“[t]he Model Rules of Professional Conduct are intended to serve as a national framework for 
implementation of standards of professional conduct” while acknowledging the large number of 
individuals from various states who comprise the legal profession). 
47. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving all powers not delegated to the federal government to 
the states). 
48. In a historical tracing of contemporary American legal professional standards, Alabama Law 
School Professional Responsibility professor, Carol Rice Andrews, explores the founding of the 
modern Rules of Professional Conduct from its foundation in western Europe, comprised of primarily 
English law traditions in the pre-nineteenth century, to the evolution of standard conceptions of 
professionalism among lawyers in Victorian England.  Andrews then ties these English professional 
standards to the development of legal ethics and professionalism in the post-revolutionary United 
States and through the contemporary era.  See generally Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for 
Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 1392, 1397, 1413–14, 1434–39 (2004) (describing 
the historical development of English and American legal professional standards).  
49. Id. at 1439; see also CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908) (“The 
future of the republic, to a great extent, depends upon our maintenance of justice pure and unsullied.  
It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the members of our profession are 
such as to merit the approval of all just men.”). 
50. See Andrews, supra note 48, at 1439 (explaining the 1908 Canons were largely modelled after 
the 1887 Alabama State Bar Association Code of Legal Ethics with some amendments and additions 
aimed at converting the code to a national standard). 
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decisions and commentary addressing each of the various rules.51  As 
Professor Andrews posits, the canonization of these standards was the 
initial step in forming a national conception of what professional 
responsibility would mean in the American legal profession.52   
For a time, the 1908 Canons remained the premier set of national 
professional standards.  While they were subject to periodic amendment and 
revision, they substantively remained relatively consistent.53  However, in 
response to constant criticism of the Canons for their largely aspirational 
and broad nature, the ABA established a committee that promulgated the 
1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility.54  
Almost every state adopted the newly minted Model Code soon after its 
promulgation.55  Accompanying this new Code were updated attitudes 
regarding the need to conform to the tenants of professional conduct.56  
Apart from the change in format to a three-part style containing the Canons, 
Ethical Considerations, and the Disciplinary Rules, the 1969 Model Code 
differed from the 1908 Canons by placing a newfound emphasis on 
punishing lawyers with disciplinary action for violations of the mandatory 
minimum requirements of lawyer professional conduct.57  The ABA never 
attained the national uniformity the association strove for under this 
promulgation of rules of professional conduct; states adopted annual 
amendments the ABA proposed at a less consistent rate than amendments 
to the 1908 Code.58  
 
51. Id. at 1440–41. 
52. See id. at 1442 (“The ABA also did more, moving the standards forward.  The ABA critiqued 
the standards, updated them to some degree, and, more importantly, nationalized them.  This 
widespread publication and application led to further debate and development of the standards.”). 
53. See id. at 1442–43 (indicating the 1908 Canons remained relevant and without substantial 
revision until 1964). 
54. Id. at 1442–44, 1443 n.440 (recalling the influence of ABA President-elect, and later U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice, Lewis Powell in studying the “adequacy and effectiveness” of the then-current 
version of the ABA Canons). 
55. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 56 (1986) (highlighting the speed 
with which the majority of states adopted the 1969 Code). 
56. See id. (“When the Code was adopted in 1969, the ABA appointed a special adoption 
committee and launched a highly organized campaign to persuade the states to adopt the Code . . . .”). 
57. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. Preliminary Statement (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (stating 
the Disciplinary Rules are mandatory in nature and serve as the baseline standard for lawyer conduct, 
with any lawyer acting beneath those standards being subject to disciplinary action). 
58. See Andrews, supra note 48, at 1446 (indicating states’ failure to adopt amendments to the 
Model Code resulted in a lack of national uniformity and stability of the Code). 
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In its continuing drive for national uniformity in the professional conduct 
of American lawyers, the ABA proposed the now-ubiquitous Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct in 1983—less than two decades after the adoption 
of the Model Code.59  In this version, the ABA eschewed the canonical 
format in favor of a “restatement format,” wherein the Rules provided 
accompanying commentary explaining and illustrating the application of 
each rule.60  State bar associations generally accepted the new version of the 
Rules, with the majority of states assenting by the year 2000.61   
The ABA subsequently elected to form yet another committee to review 
the standards of professional conduct—this time set forth in the Model 
Rules—called the Ethics 2000 Commission.62  Despite the adoption of the 
Model Rules in virtually every state in the years leading up to the turn of the 
century, states were adopting different versions of the Model Rules and 
making alterations to suit their local conditions.63  Furthermore, changes in 
the legal profession since the promulgation of the 1983 Model Rules—
particularly due to the advance of technology—forced a need to deal with 
new contentions in legal practice.64  At the conclusion of a five-year process 
beginning in 1997, the Ethics 2000 Commission worked through all the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, recommending and making both substantive 
and stylistic changes to almost every rule.65  The changes resulted in the 
contemporary Model Rules of Professional Conduct in their current form.66   
As previously discussed, Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) falls under the mandatory 
withdrawal rule when an attorney must decline or terminate representation 
 
59. See generally id. at 1446–52 (indicating forty-four states adopted these “Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct” in some form as of 2003, though the ABA continued to adjust them as of the 
time of this writing). 
60. Id. at 1446–47. 
61. Id. at 1448. 
62. See generally Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: 
Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 441, 442–43 (2002) (summarizing 
the work of the Ethics 2000 Commission as it relates to amending the 1983 ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct). 
63. See Robert A. Creamer, Form Over Federalism: The Case for Consistency in State Ethics Rules 
Formats, 13 PROF’L LAW. 23, 23 (2002) (describing the current non-uniformity of the various state 
ethics rules, with a small minority of states having completely unique professional conduct systems and 
a majority of states having adopted the Model Rules but with varying degrees of compliance with ABA 
recommended amendments). 
64. Andrews, supra note 48, at 1448–49. 
65. Love, supra note 62, at 441–42. 
66. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (setting forth the 
present-day Model Rules). 
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of clients.67  Among the explicitly enumerated instances requiring 
mandatory withdrawal, Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) mandates a lawyer withdraw 
or forgo representation when a physical or mental condition materially 
impairs the ability of a lawyer to represent his or her clients.68  The 
substance of contemporary Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) has been present in the 
national standards of professional conduct since the 1908 Canons of 
Professional Ethics, though its less-defined form created a duty to withdraw 
for good cause if the lawyer found him or herself incapable.69  The 
canonical form of what is today Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) took its more familiar 
form in the 1969 Model Code Disciplinary Rule 2-110(B)(3).70   
Today, every state and the District of Columbia has adopted Rule 1.16.71  
Certain stylistic variations exist between Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) and its 
various state counterparts, as the states have continued to adapt the Rules 
to their local conditions; however, there are no significant substantive 
variations between Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) and the various state 
equivalents.72  The ABA achieved its express goal of creating national 
uniformity, at least regarding the substance of Rule 1.16(a)(2).  The Model 
Rules serve as the base of analysis for dealing with the professional 
disciplinary treatment of lawyer mental health, specifically as it relates to the 
duty to withdraw, incumbent on suffering practitioners whose conditions 
materially impair their ability to represent clients.73  
 
67.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16. 
68. See id. (stating, in pertinent part, “a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where 
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if . . . the lawyer’s 
physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client . . . ”). 
69. CANONS OF PROF’L & JUD. ETHICS Canon 44 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908) (adopting phrasing 
closely resembling what is present in the contemporary Model Rule: “The right of an attorney or 
counsel to withdraw from employment, once assumed, arises only from good cause . . . if the lawyer 
finds himself incapable of conducting the case effectively”). 
70. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. DR 2-110(B)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“A lawyer 
representing a client before a tribunal . . . shall withdraw from employment, if: [h]is mental or physical 
condition renders it unreasonably difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively.”).  
71. See generally ABA CPR POL’Y IMPLEM. COMM., VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: RULE 1.16 DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION (2018) 
(providing various states’ versions of Rule 1.16).   
72. Id. 
73. See Patrick E. Longan, Teaching Professionalism, 60 MERCER L. REV. 659, 679 (2008) 
(discussing the teaching of professional responsibility in law school courses as being based primarily 
on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct).  
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III.    ANALYSIS: DUTIES INVOKED UNDER THE MODEL RULE   
Under Model Rule 1.16(a)(2), the ABA formed the duties to protect both 
clients and the profession generally from lawyers practicing with mental 
health conditions that materially impair their ability to represent clients.74  
However, in an era where state bar associations are increasingly concerned 
with providing rehabilitative aid and resources to lawyers, these duties may 
inhibit lawyers from seeking the aid they may desperately need.  The 
construction of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2), in conjunction with the interplay of 
other rules, ensures this result.  Furthermore, the ABA’s lack of guidance 
requires state courts to take the initiative in defining the components of the 
duties invoked under Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) through case law, leading to 
inconsistent results. 
A. Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) in Form and in Substance 
To begin, a plain reading of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) dictates two necessary 
elements for a violation of this rule to occur: a lawyer must have a “mental 
condition” that “materially impairs” the lawyer’s ability to provide 
representation for his or her clients.75  The Iowa Supreme Court put 
forward this proposition in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. 
Cunningham,76 where the court held the state disciplinary board is required 
to prove, in tandem, the existence of a mental condition materially impairing 
the lawyer’s representation of the client.77  A mere reference to “health 
reasons” in place of the “mental condition” element proved insufficient for 
the Iowa Supreme Court in Cunningham to justify a reprimand of the lawyer’s 
inadequate performance under the Iowa state equivalent to Model 
Rule 1.16(a)(2).78  Cunningham is further instructive in dicta where the Iowa 
Supreme Court laments the dearth of case law interpreting the Rule.79  This 
lack of guidance is not unique to Iowa; case law involving the state 
equivalents to Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) reveals a lack of a definitive 
 
74. See Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Scott, 579 S.E.2d 550, 559 (W. Va. 2003) (McGraw, J., 
dissenting) (maintaining the purpose of lawyer discipline is to protect the client and profession, not to 
punish a lawyer for possessing a mental health condition—bipolar II disorder in the context of this 
opinion). 
75. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
76. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cunningham, 812 N.W.2d 541 (Iowa 2012). 
77. See id. at 548 (denoting the findings necessary to hold a lawyer violated the duty to withdraw 
while having a mental condition under the state equivalent to Model Rule 1.16).  
78. Id. at 548–49. 
79. Id. at 548. 
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proposition as to what constitutes a mental condition or material 
impairment.80  Given the crucial importance of those two features and the 
lack of instruction, Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) is unworkable from the start. 
This Comment addresses the element of materiality only to the extent 
necessary to consider in relation to mental conditions that might trigger the 
Model Rules.  The lack of definition of “mental condition” under Model 
Rule 1.16(a)(2) indicates lawyers may risk exposing themselves to a 
mandatory duty under the Rules if they even seek counsel regarding 
suspected mental health conditions such as anxiety, depression, or bipolar 
disorder.81  The required mental state for a violation of this Model Rule—
knowledge82—means as soon as the lawyer becomes aware of his or her 
condition and feels it will materially impair representation of any client, the 
lawyer is placed under the mandatory duty to withdraw.83   
The pertinent comments to Model Rule 1.16 provide no guidance as to 
what constitutes a mental condition triggering the duty to withdraw or 
decline representation.84  At least one commentator has noted, despite the 
significant role the existence of a mental condition plays in an analysis of 
violations under this rule, neither the Rule itself nor the pertinent 
commentary defines what constitutes a “mental condition.”85  This leaves 
disciplinary authorities to their own devices when determining what qualifies 
as a mental condition when a lawyer may not have considered his or her 
situation a violation.  Disciplinary bodies considering common mental 
health disorder symptoms afflicting the legal profession would be acting well 
within reason to consider anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder as 
qualifying conditions.86   
 
80. In addition to this lack of clarity in Model Rule 1.16 itself, the subsequent comments fail to 
expand on, explain, or clarify the terms.  See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmts. 
81. See Sheridan’s Case, 813 A.2d 449, 453–54 (N.H. 2002) (assuming the lawyer’s bipolar 
disorder constituted a “mental disorder” for the purpose of disciplining the lawyer).  
82. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (defining knowledge as “actual knowledge 
of the fact in question.  A person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances”). 
83. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (providing the mandatory duty to withdraw 
or forgo representation when a lawyer suffers from a mental condition materially impairing the ability 
of the lawyer to represent clients). 
84. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmts. 2–3. 
85. See Christina M. Costa, Preparing for the Senior Tsunami: Cognitive Decline in Aging Lawyers, 
28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 471, 478–79 (2015) (discussing the failure of the Rule to elaborate on the 
applicability of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) in the context of what constitutes a qualifying mental condition). 
86. See Fla. Bar v. Shanzer, 572 So. 2d 1382, 1383–84 (Fla. 1991) (acknowledging the mental 
health problems plaguing the legal profession in a lawyer disbarment proceeding). 
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Symptoms of these mental health conditions possess a similar capacity to 
affect the mind of suffering lawyers.  Bipolar disorder includes symptoms 
such as chronic or episodic instances of extreme manic or depressive 
episodes, which affect the energy, mood, focus, and concentration of an 
afflicted person.87  When in a manic state, a person can feel an outsized 
sense of confidence, talent, and ability, which manifests in higher-than-
normal activity levels, possibly accompanied by an irritable disposition.88  
However, the converse is also true; when in a depressive state, the same 
person can feel unable to complete even simple tasks, and feelings of 
hopelessness can border on thoughts of death or suicide.89   
When considering lawyers suffering from anxiety also often cope with 
stressful occupational situations, maintaining good mental health becomes 
even more difficult.  With pressing deadlines, high-stakes, a contentious 
process, and court filing dates often present in a lawyer’s life, most lawyers 
may interpret the symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder as a product of 
conducting their profession.90  The National Institute of Mental Health, 
however, has classified the extreme state of worry and nervousness as a 
mental disease necessitating treatment.  Trouble concentrating, insomnia, 
chronic fatigue, irritability, and fainting spells are just a few of the physical 
symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder.91  Already predisposed to 
situations that lead to anxiety, lawyers are at even greater risk of experiencing 
a negative impact on their performance if their simple anxiety transforms 
into generalized anxiety disorder.92   
Depression—the most common mental impairment lawyers’ assistance 
programs report calls for services for—shares similar symptomologies with 
 
87. NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, BIPOLAR DISORDER, supra note 12. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. See Dan Defoe, [Lawyer] Anxiety, Self-Protective Behavior, Ethical Sinkholes, and Professional 
Responsibility, PSYCHOLAWLOGY (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.psycholawlogy.com/2015/08/10/ 
lawyer-anxiety-self-protective-behavior-ethical-sinkholes-and-professional-responsibility/?utm_sourc 
e=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Psycholawlogy+%28Psycholawlogy
%29 [https://perma.cc/CP6V-6VEK] (“Lawyers experience nervousness, tension, dread, or 
apprehension because of their work or workplace environment.”).  
91. See NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, WHEN WORRY GETS OUT OF CONTROL, supra 
note 10 (listing various symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder). 
92. See generally Bree Buchanan & Chris Ritter, Ten Tips for Lawyers Dealing with Stress, Mental 
Health, and Substance Use Issues, STATE BAR OF TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/ (search for “Ten Tips 
for Lawyers Dealing with Stress, Mental Health, and Substance Use Issues”, and click the first link) 
[https://perma.cc/3DBG-YJXJ] (explaining the prevalence and potential impact of generalized anxiety 
disorder). 
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anxiety and bipolar disorder.  Lawyers experiencing depression may 
experience feelings of helplessness and worthlessness, have difficulty 
concentrating, remembering, or making decisions, have a loss of energy, 
insomnia, aches and pains, and may begin contemplating death or suicide.93  
All these mental conditions can potentially hinder a lawyer from completing 
responsibilities to his or her clients.  Absent guidance from the Model Rules, 
any one of these mental conditions could, on its face, satisfy the definition 
of a qualifying mental condition.  
Examining other Model Rules dealing with mental health yields little 
assistance in understanding what specific mental conditions qualify under 
Model Rule 1.16(a)(2).  For instance, Model Rule 1.14—Client with 
Diminished Capacity—speaks to the duties involved when a lawyer deals 
with a client of diminished mental capacity.94  Unfortunately, other than a 
reference to minority, Model Rule 1.14 gives no indication what a mental 
impairment specifically constitutes.  Thus, no analogous definition is 
transferable to “mental condition” as used in Model Rule 1.16(a)(2).  
Moreover, Model Rule 1.0—Terminology—fails to define mental condition 
or materially impairs.95 
Given the critical role the presence of a mental condition has as an 
element in determining whether a violation of the duty a lawyer has under 
Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) has occurred, the lack of definition or guidance leads 
to unworkable results.  The ABA’s Formal Ethics Opinion 03-429 briefly 
mentions some mental conditions, like Tourette’s Syndrome, might appear 
to impair the ability of a lawyer to represent clients but in reality do not 
materially impair the lawyer-client relationship.96  Unfortunately, there is no 
mention of the effects of anxiety, depression, or bipolar disorder—three of 
the most common mental conditions lawyers report suffering.97 
B. Interplay of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) and the Other Model Rules 
The interplay of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) and Model Rule 8.3 further 
exacerbates the tensions and desires lawyers suffering from mental health 
issues like anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder experience when 
contemplating whether to seek treatment or continue practicing law 
 
93. Foster, supra note 39, at 222. 
94. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (detailing the 
specific duties a lawyer has when his or her client is mentally impaired). 
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0. 
96. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 03-429 (2003). 
97. Krill et al., supra note 27, at 50. 
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untreated.  Model Rule 8.3—Reporting Professional Misconduct—
obligates lawyers to file a report with the appropriate authority if they have 
knowledge of any other lawyer’s violation of any Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct that may raise a substantial question about the violating lawyer’s 
fitness to practice law.98  The implication of this duty, taken to its furthest 
reaches, might mean when lawyers know a colleague who is suffering from 
anxiety, depression, or bipolar disorder, those lawyers risk violating their 
duty under Model Rule 8.3 if they do not take actions against their impaired 
colleague whether or not there is an actual violation of the Model Rules.99  
The proposition is seemingly confirmed based on publications from a 
pair of related ABA Formal Ethics Opinions.  The first opinion, Formal 
Ethics Opinion 03-431, speaks to the interplay of Rules 1.16(a)(2) and 8.3—
where an attorney knows another attorney has a mental condition that 
materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent his or her clients.100  The 
opinion states:  
Although not all violations of the Model Rules are reportable events under 
Rule 8.3, as they may not raise a substantial question about a lawyer’s fitness 
to practice law, a lawyer’s failure to withdraw from representation while 
suffering from a condition materially impairing her ability to practice, as 
required by Rule 1.16(a)(2), ordinarily would raise a substantial question 
requiring reporting under Rule 8.3.101  
In effect, the legal profession’s self-regulatory nature serves to make lawyers 
watchdogs over each other’s mental health to protect clients and the 
profession.102  Lawyers unaware they are suffering from the effects of 
diagnosable mental health conditions may attempt to write off their feelings 
or, even worse, attempt to hide their issues from professional colleagues for 
fear of the implicated duty thereby raised.   
Practically, the disciplinary implications for practicing while suffering 
from mental conditions such as anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder 
 
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3. 
99. See Thomas P. Sukowicz, The Ethics of Reporting on Your Colleague—or Yourself, 26 GPSOLO 36, 
38–39 (2009) (arguing since a lawyer violating Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) involves a material impairment to 
the representation of a client, violation itself calls into question the fitness of the lawyer to carry out 
the representation). 
100. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 03-431 (2003). 
101. Id. 
102. See id. (stating while lawyers are not health care professionals, they still have a duty to look 
out for recognizable symptoms of mental health impairment). 
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might act as a deterrent from seeking help.  The ABA opinion itself admits 
the difficulty of confronting the affected lawyer about the circumstances of 
the condition or the effect on his or her clients, going on to say the afflicted 
lawyer may deny the allegations or seek to assure themselves or others that 
any problem has been resolved.103  After all, once the lawyer gains 
knowledge of their mental condition or allows their symptoms to manifest 
such that they force other lawyers to report them, the Model Rules may no 
longer permit the afflicted lawyer to continue practicing law.104   
Relatedly, ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 03-429 speaks to the obligations 
of lawyers within the same firm when dealing with their mentally impaired 
coworkers.  This opinion admits lawyers with mental conditions impairing 
their ability to represent their clients may be oblivious to or in denial of their 
condition.105  Still, the opinion reaffirms “[i]impaired lawyers have the same 
obligations under the Model Rules as other lawyers”; a mental impairment 
does not alleviate the responsibility of a lawyer to conduct themselves in 
conformity with the Model Rules.106  State supreme court decisions echo 
this sentiment regarding lawyers accused of violating Model 
Rule 1.16(a)(2).107   
Although this logic serves to protect clients and the legal profession, it is 
at odds with the desire to protect suffering lawyers’ mental health.  It places 
lawyers suffering from anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder on the 
receiving end of possible disciplinary actions due to their struggles with 
mental health.  The ABA admits, however, the unpredictable nature of how 
a mental condition will impair an afflicted lawyer.  Lawyers’ mental health 
conditions are not always so severe as to materially impair their ability to 
 
103. Id. 
104. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (indicating an 
attorney who suffers from a mental condition materially impairing her ability to represent her client is 
required to withdraw from representing the client); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 & 
cmt. 1 (indicating a reporting attorney “shall inform the appropriate professional authority” of another 
attorney’s “violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct”). 
105. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 03-429 (2003). 
106. Id. 
107. See In re Kelly, 917 N.E.2d 658, 659 (Ind. 2009) (holding the personal conditions of lawyers 
are irrelevant to the client’s entitlement to protection from lawyer misfeasance vis-à-vis professional 
conduct); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kingery, 871 N.W.2d 109, 120 (Iowa 2015) (holding 
as irrelevant the mental condition of a lawyer with bipolar disorder in a disciplinary action based on 
her failure to withdraw under the state equivalent to Model Rule 1.16(a)(2)). 
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represent their clients.108  A lawyer with a mental condition does not have 
an obligation to withdraw or forgo representation when the mental 
condition does not materially affect their ability to represent clients.109  The 
reporting duty under Model Rule 8.3, therefore, ebbs and flows along with 
the episodic nature of triggering mental health conditions like anxiety, 
depression, and bipolar disorder.110   
When a mental condition is not enough to materially impair the conduct 
of the lawyer, the current rules effectively treat those mental conditions as a 
matter of private concern.111  Only when the lawyer is materially impaired 
does the lawyer violate Model Rule 1.16(a)(2).  However, the lack of an 
adequate definition of what constitutes a mental condition leaves state 
disciplinary panels and state supreme courts in control of what constitutes 
a qualifying condition.112  The inner workings of the Model Rules miss the 
goal of uniformity by leaving these critical issues for the states to decide.  
Concomitantly, this leaves lawyers wondering whether they are subject to 
professional discipline as a result of their having mental health conditions.   
Advances in medical technology unavailable at the time of the drafting of 
the Model Rules have provided a deeper understanding of many medical 
conditions.  Particularly in the field of genetic sequencing, people can gain 
increased access to information regarding their genetic predispositions.113  
As genetic sequencing becomes able to detect certain mental 
predispositions, courts must decide how far they will go in extending a 
lawyer’s duty to include properly informing themselves of their conditions 
 
108. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 03-429 (2003) (acknowledging the 
symptoms of mental health conditions, such as anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder, fluctuate 
between good and bad days when the manifestation of symptoms is impactful). 
109. See Sukowicz, supra note 99, at 39 (“Sometimes a lawyer’s psychological condition or 
addiction is either not serious enough for a transfer to inactive status or the attorney has begun 
treatment for the condition or addiction and is recovering.”). 
110. See In re Barnes, 691 N.E.2d 1225, 1226 (Ind. 1998) (disciplining a depressed lawyer for 
failing to withdraw from a bankruptcy matter only once it occurred to the lawyer he could no longer 
pursue the action). 
111. Sukowicz, supra note 99, at 40. 
112. See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Olver, 831 A.2d 66, 70 (Md. 2003) (addressing the issue of 
whether Major Depression, a chronic mental illness, constituted a mental condition satisfying the 
requirements of a conditional diversion agreement for attorney discipline). 
113. See Sarah L. Scott, I Am Not Sick Now but I Might Be Later: Personal Genome Sequencing and 
Ethical Obligations for Lawyers, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 979, 984–85 (2013) (discussing the Human 
Genome Project and the increased accessibility to a person’s genetic information for purposes of 
determining genetic predispositions to certain diseases). 
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in the interest of protecting clients and the legal profession.114  Again, the 
ABA’s lack of guidance leaves states with a vast degree of control and 
produces an unworkable result for lawyers suffering from mental health 
conditions and trying to maintain professional responsibility.   
C. Case Law Implications on the Functioning of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) 
Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) presents problems for attorneys suffering mental 
health conditions not only in its substance and form but most consequently 
in its execution.  The mandatory duty to withdraw from representation 
under Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) also proves unworkable to protect a lawyer’s 
interest in receiving treatment due to the requirement to persist in 
representation if the court disapproves withdrawal.115  Even when a 
mentally impaired lawyer admits to the need to comply with the withdrawal 
provision, courts have the discretion to refuse the ability to withdraw.  A 
lawyer suffering anxiety, depression, or bipolar disorder who attempts to 
comply with the Model Rules may, consequently, be unable to do so.   
Overriding policy considerations grant courts this discretion, but when a 
tribunal refuses to permit withdrawal, a lawyer maintains the full extent of 
his or her duty to provide representation to the client.116  In the ABA’s 
terms, this results in a mentally impaired lawyer with the continued duty to 
represent clients and, as a potential consequence, ineffectively represented 
clients and damage to the profession.117  Courts have not shied away from 
exercising their authority under this provision to deny lawyers who claim 
mental conditions the ability to withdraw.118  In Wenzy v. State,119 the 
defendant’s lawyer made several motions to the court requesting leave to 
withdraw as counsel, citing the duty to withdraw due to his mental and 
 
114. See id. at 989–90, 992 (speaking to the duty lawyers have towards their clients under various 
provisions under the Model Rules which seem to implicate a professional responsibility for the lawyer 
to have themselves tested for predispositions to medical issues). 
115. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“When 
ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for 
terminating the representation.”). 
116. See Wenzy v. State, 855 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d) 
(“Once his motions to withdraw were denied, Cato was under a duty to represent Wenzy to the fullest 
of his ability.”) (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(c), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X, § 9)). 
117. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 & cmts 2–3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2020) (indicating protecting clients and the profession are reasons for the mandatory duty to withdraw). 
118. See, e.g., Wenzy, 855 S.W.2d at 48 (describing an instance when a trial court consistently 
denied an attorney’s motion to withdraw from representation). 
119. Wenzy v. State, 855 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d). 
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psychological conditions materially impairing his ability to represent the 
client.120  The appeals court overrode the lawyer’s duty to withdraw under 
the state equivalent to Model Rule 1.16(a)(2), citing the duty of a lawyer to 
gain permission of the trial court prior to withdrawing as counsel.121   
This means, for lawyers suffering legitimate cases of anxiety, depression, 
or bipolar disorder, the duty incumbent on them to withdraw from 
representation is not fully theirs.  Not only must a lawyer recognize the 
mental health issues he or she suffers from and its stifling effect on the 
ability to practice law, but the lawyer must also hope the court grants the 
motion to withdraw if the lawyer’s representation of a client involves a case 
pending before a trial court.  While the need to protect the profession and 
clients is indeed of paramount importance, Model Rule 1.16(a)(2), to a 
degree, fails to protect the professionals. 
Without intending to cast an unfairly broad generalization over the 
national legal profession through recent history, it is fair to say acceptance 
of the legitimacy of mental health conditions is far from ubiquitous today 
and was even less so historically.122  Courts have historically been relatively 
harsh in their treatment of lawyers who knew of their underlying mental and 
physical conditions while continuing to practice law.  In Stark County Bar 
Association v. Lukens,123 a lawyer suffering from a combination of diabetes 
and porphyria was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.124  The 
court confronted whether a lawyer who obviously knew of his physical or 
emotional condition could continue to hold himself out as a competent 
practitioner.125  Answering in the negative, the court stated the lawyer 
should have stopped taking new cases altogether.126  Case law is fraught 
with skeptical attitudes regarding the ability of lawyers possessing mental 
health conditions to practice law at all; as one judge analogized, the medical 
profession would never let a doctor with palsy conduct surgery.127   
 
120. Id. at 48. 
121. Id. at 49. 
122. See David A. Grenardo, You Are Not Alone: What Law Schools Must Do to Help Law Students 
with Mental Health and Substance Abuse Issues, 10 HOUS. L. REV. 7, 8 (2019) (discussing the struggles 
President Abraham Lincoln had with depression, or melancholy as it was then known, during his stint 
as a law student and lawyer). 
123. Stark Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Lukens, 357 N.E.2d 1083 (Ohio 1976). 
124. Id. at 1089. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. See In re Sherman, 404 P.2d 978, 983 (Wash. 1965) (Rosellini, C.J., dissenting) (advocating 
suspension of an attorney and drawing an analogy between a lawyer practicing with the “handicap” of 
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As society has begun to recognize, understand, and accept the prevalence 
of mental health conditions in the legal profession, courts have shown 
increasing acknowledgment of the mental health conditions facing legal 
practitioners.128  However, mere acknowledgement does not necessarily 
translate to improvements in disciplinary outcomes for lawyers related to 
the duties incumbent on lawyers with mental health conditions.   
Not only can the courts frustrate a lawyer’s ability to withdraw under the 
provisions of the Model Rules, but a lawyer must also contend with the 
wishes of his or her clients in determining whether to withdraw.  In People v. 
Mendus,129 a Colorado lawyer suffered anxiety to the point of having a 
mental breakdown while representing two clients in divorce proceedings.130  
Despite the lawyer’s repeated pleas to her clients begging them to authorize 
her withdrawal from the case due to her mental health problems, the clients 
insisted the lawyer continue representing them.131 
After failing to withdraw and suffering a mental breakdown, the lawyer 
was ultimately sanctioned for her violation of the state equivalent of Model 
Rule 1.16(a)(2).132  Critics may contend the lawyer had a duty to withdraw 
no matter the client’s wishes.  This ignores the lawyer’s frazzled mental state 
and her desire to do right by her clients.  In assigning a two-year suspension 
for violation of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2), the court only briefly considered the 
fact that the lawyer informed her clients of her condition and suggested they 
retain other counsel.133   
Even when lawyers attempt to comply with professional obligations, their 
clients’ interests are of concern.  For better or worse, lawyers rely on their 
 
mental illness with a doctor practicing surgery while suffering from some form of palsy); Lukens, 
357 N.E.2d at 1089 (questioning whether an attorney suffering from diabetes and porphyria “should 
continue to hold himself out as an attorney in general practice” given the implications those conditions 
had on his mental health). 
128. See Fla. Bar v. Shanzer, 572 So. 2d 1382, 1383–84 (Fla. 1991) (acknowledging the 
prevalence of depression and other mental health problems in many lawyers). 
129. People v. Mendus, 360 P.3d 1049 (Colo. 2015). 
130. See id. at 1051–52 (examining a case where a lawyer claimed her anxiety and depression 
impaired her ability to represent her clients; the clients insisted she nevertheless continue to represent 
them). 
131. See id. (describing conversations between the lawyer and her clients which detail the 
lawyer’s struggles with her work due to her mental condition).  
132. Id.   
133. See id. at 1051–52, 1055 (indicating the court briefly considered the lawyer’s conversations 
with her clients regarding her mental condition before finding the lawyer’s actions warranted a two-
year suspension). 
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reputations to attract clients.134  Clients may neither understand nor care to 
understand the complexities of a mandatory duty of withdrawal; lawyers in 
an already precarious mental position are thus tasked with the additional 
burden of caring for client sensibilities.135  The proposition that a lawyer 
would want to protect his or her reputation to prevent a loss of current and 
future clientele is not so farfetched.  Therefore, while no formal requirement 
dictates a lawyer must comply with a client’s wishes to persist in 
representation, it is an implicit requirement in the legal profession.   
Recent case law demonstrates courts in disciplinary proceedings are more 
willing to accept mental health conditions, like depression or anxiety, 
primarily when physical conditions accompany or give rise to the mental 
state.  When an attorney has an underlying mental condition, courts are 
much more willing to accept it when a physical condition explains 
psychosomatic symptomology adversely affecting their representation of a 
client.136  Despite the effects mental conditions like anxiety and depression 
can have, courts in the past have expressed skepticism in taking a lawyer’s 
own testimony during a disciplinary action regarding his or her mental health 
status without an accompanying diagnosis.137   
  In Mulkey v. Meridian Oil, Inc.,138 the trial court chastised a firm that had 
two lawyers working on a personal injury case who were both involved in 
significant tragedies.139  Morris, the lawyer originally assigned, was in a 
plane crash shortly before the suit commenced that resulted in his wife’s 
death and critical injuries to himself and his children; Keirsey, assigned to 
cover Morris, was experiencing severe emotional strain during the time he 
represented the plaintiff.140  Citing Oklahoma’s version of Model 
Rule 1.16(a)(2), the court took issue with the firm continuing to operate 
 
134. See Zacharias, supra note 42, at 176 (exploring the significance of a lawyer’s reputation in 
an effective law practice). 
135. See Young Laws. Network, Should I Fire My Client?, 24 PROB. & PROP., Jul./Aug. 2010, at 8 
(discussing the subtle difficulties present in terminating representation of a client).  
136. See State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Southern, 15 P.3d 1, 4, 7 (Okla. 2000) (examining an 
attorney with a vitamin deficiency illness that aggravated his depression). 
137. See In re Winterburg, 41 P.3d 842, 846–47 (Kan. 2002) (expressing skepticism regarding the 
self-diagnosis of depression even where a lawyer testified it left her in a state of near paralysis, she was 
receiving treatment from a psychiatrist, and she was being prescribed medication for depression and a 
hormonal imbalance).   
138. Mulkey v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 257 (W.D. Okla. 1992). 
139. See id. at 259 (explaining the tragic events counsel assigned to the case experienced). 
140. See id. at 259–60 (downplaying the relevance of the plane crash, the court conceded it might 
have given rise to emotional consequences yet still elected to sanction the lawyers after taking issue 
with the dates Keirsey gave regarding his mental condition). 
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while “unable to competently represent existing clients.”141  The court 
sanctioned Morris and Keirsey for their deficient performances and required 
them to explain to the plaintiff why they continued operating while under 
their “alleged emotional difficulties.”142  The court balanced the equities 
against the lawyers despite their explanations.  Dismissive attitudes and lack 
of empathy toward mental health conditions portend the possibility of 
underlying skepticism accompanying claims of mental health conditions. 
Similar trends of skepticism exist in other cases where lawyers suffering 
mental health concerns had the duty to withdraw triggered; take the case of 
lawyer Southern, the subject of State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. 
Southern.143  The death of an immediate family member and serious illnesses 
took a toll on the lawyer’s mental health, as the court candidly admitted.144  
However, the court paid attention to Southern’s vitamin B-12 deficiency to 
explain his extreme depressive symptomology.145  Despite the common 
effects of depression,146 the court chose to focus on Southern’s vitamin 
B-12 deficiency, which aggravated the depressive symptoms.147   
This analytical trend is also present in the case of In re Fitzharris,148 where 
an attorney was disciplined for violating South Carolina’s equivalent of 
Model Rule 1.16(a)(2).149  In laying down her definite suspension for 
unduly delaying disbursement of a client’s settlement funds, the court 
considered Fitzharris’s physical and mental conditions at the time of the 
violation.150  The court accepted the legitimacy of lawyer Fitzharris’s 
treatment for anxiety and depression when the underlying cause was a series 
 
141. Id. at 260. 
142. Id. at 262. 
143. See, e.g., State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Southern, 15 P.3d 1, 2 (Okla. 2000) (providing an 
underlying physical condition was solely a mitigating factor despite the lawyer’s suffering from an illness 
which caused severe symptoms). 
144. Id. at 7. 
145. See id. (examining an attorney with a vitamin deficiency disorder that aggravated his 
depression, as both disorders have similar symptoms including weakness, fatigue, and memory lapses).   
146. See Alec Coppen & Christina Bolander-Gouaille, Treatment of Depression: Time to Consider 
Folic Acid and Vitamin B12, 19 J. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 59, 60–61 (2005) (describing several studies 
finding depressive patients often had low vitamin B-12 levels). 
147. Southern, 15 P.3d at 7. 
148. In re Fitzharris, 782 S.E.2d 596 (S.C. 2016). 
149. Id. at 597. 
150. Id. at 596–97 (punishing a lawyer’s mishandling of a client’s matters due to depression and 
anxiety). 
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of back and shoulder surgeries during which serious complications arose 
and caused her depressed state.151   
An underlying physical condition was also present in the case of Lawyer 
Disciplinary Board v. Dues,152 where the court accepted as legitimate the 
lawyer’s claims of depression.153  The court made it a point to emphasize 
Dues was an upstanding member of the bar until he suffered a heart attack 
requiring triple bypass surgery and a related prostate operation.154  The 
court accepted these facts as an explanation for his depressed state and 
ultimately reduced the recommended suspension to a public reprimand and 
temporary limitation of his practice to “work as a mental hygiene 
commissioner.”155  The court took as persuasive medical testimony 
attributing “[his] legal deficiencies directly to the serious depression that 
flowed from Mr. Dues’ physical impairments.”156 
The dissenting opinion of Dues displays the lingering antipathy toward 
considering the mental health conditions of lawyers in determining 
discipline.  Justice Benjamin acknowledges the stigmatized and difficult 
nature of mental illness in American society, yet opines: “our compassion 
for the person inflicted should not include condoning harm to innocent 
persons arising from a failure or refusal to get appropriate help for a mental 
illness, such as depression.”157  While Justice Benjamin’s motivations lie in 
protecting clients from potential harm, his premise that enforcing strict 
disciplinary standards is the best way to protect the public is debatable.158  
Dues did seek treatment for his depression during the period of his 
misconduct—in fact, his doctor indicated with proper treatment he could 
work again as an attorney159—yet views like Justice Benjamin’s would seek 
to foreclose this possibility.  
Thus, there are a variety of judicial attitudes regarding the legitimacy of 
lawyer mental health.  This almost hostile environment may dissuade 
 
151. See id. at 597 (accepting the lawyer’s Agreement for Discipline by Consent after the lawyer 
acknowledged her “physical and mental health issues contributed to the problems with Client’s case”). 
152. Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Dues, 624 S.E.2d 125 (W. Va. 2005). 
153. See id. at 133 (finding the lawyer’s mental disability was a mitigating factor). 
154. Id. at 133–34. 
155. Id. at 134–35. 
156. See id. at 133–34 (concluding the lawyer’s mental disability justified limiting the lawyer’s 
practice rather than suspending his license). 
157. Id. at 135 (Benjamin, J., dissenting). 
158. See id. (emphasizing the need to “enforce appropriate consequences for acts and/or 
omissions which harm . . . clients”). 
159. Id. at 132–33 (majority opinion). 
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lawyers from seeking treatment for their mental health conditions as they 
may face discipline for their conduct.  The lack of definition present in 
Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) makes this morass of case law the default guide to 
understanding how a court should treat a lawyer’s mental health.  With 
principles of stare decisis guiding judicial decision-making in the American 
legal system, the analytical idiosyncrasies present in these opinions remain 
entrenched in how courts deal with violations of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2).160  
Thus the unworkable effects of the Model Rule are continued in virtual 
perpetuity. 
IV.    RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Mandatory Visits to Mental Health Physicians as a Condition to Practice   
One possible avenue to amend the Model Rules to simultaneously 
improve the functioning of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) and to protect the mental 
health of lawyers is to require mandatory visits with mental health 
professionals as a condition of continuing to practice law.  Such a plan could 
be effectuated much like how some states have adopted requirements for 
lawyers to maintain a certain amount of continuing legal education hours to 
maintain competence under Model Rule 1.1.161  In maintaining the demand 
for competency under this Rule, the ABA Model Rule commentary 
encourages but does not require lawyers to “engage in continuing study and 
education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to 
which the lawyer is subject.”162 
Absent mandatory language, failure to comply with these suggestions in 
maintaining competency would not subject an attorney to disciplinary 
sanction under a strict Model Rules jurisdiction.163  Some state bar 
associations have independently changed their professional responsibility 
rules to incorporate a mandatory obligation on actively practicing lawyers to 
 
160. See Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 3–4 (2012) (discussing the principle of stare decisis as it relates to preserving analytical foundations 
between like cases). 
161. See, e.g., MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. (2020) (requiring lawyers give 
competent representation as it relates to skill, aptitude, preparation, and thoroughness in conducting 
the practice of law and participate in continuing legal education to maintain such knowledge and skill). 
162. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).  
163. Cf. Longan, supra note 73, at 681 (discussing the aspirational nature of the Model Rules vis-
à-vis pro bono service and the general lack of lawyer participation in the absence of a mandatory duty 
to participate). 
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attain a certain amount of education in pertinent legal and ethical fields to 
remain in good standing.164  Texas, for instance, requires attorneys to 
accomplish fifteen hours of continuing legal education annually, specifically 
requiring twelve to come from accredited sources to maintain compliance 
with State Bar Rules and remain in good standing.165  
A Texas lawyer failing to comply with these continuing legal education 
requirements faces the possibility of suspension from the practice of law.166  
When cast in these mandatory terms, non-compliance with legal education 
would leave members of the Texas State Bar unable to practice, surely 
providing the ultimate incentive to comply.167  Should the ABA decide to 
amend its Model Rules, this is transferable to the concern for lawyer mental 
health by making lawyers receive a proscribed amount of mental health 
checkups or therapy sessions every year.168  
Such a requirement would serve the profession two-fold.  It would 
protect clients from lawyers unaware of or unwilling to deal with their 
mental health conditions, and it would also force lawyers to acknowledge 
the presence of any adverse mental health issues from which they are 
suffering.  In light of the lack of clear guidance as to what constitutes a 
qualifying mental condition, this requirement would potentially save lawyers 
from having to guess whether they are practicing at an impaired level and 
from discipline if their conditions are treated before the “materially impairs 
representation” prong of the Model Rules is triggered. 
Indeed, state supreme courts have recently allowed the disciplinary option 
of continued participation in mental health wellness programs to attorneys 
suffering anxiety and depression.  Continued participation ensures 
rehabilitation and the ability of the lawyer to practice.  In some 
circumstances, the courts have tacitly acknowledged the benefits practicing 
lawyers would gain from mental health therapy.  The District of Colombia 
Court of Appeals, for instance, in In re Peek,169 stayed the final two months 
 
164. See, e.g., TEX. STATE BAR R. art. XII, § 6, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, 
subtit. G, app. A (“Every member must complete 15 hours of continuing legal education during each 
compliance year as provided by this article.”). 
165. Id. 
166. Id. § 8.  
167. Cf. Pro Bono, TEX. ACCESS TO JUST. COMM’N, https://www.texasatj.org/pro-bono 
[https://perma.cc/8N8J-L9GE] (estimating the amount of pro bono hours Texas lawyers provide at 
approximately 2.5 million annually). 
168. Cf. Longan, supra note 73, at 681 (discussing the lack of compliance with Model Rule 
provisions regarding pro bono service due to a general lack of enforcement mechanisms).   
169. In re Peek, 565 A.2d 627 (D.C. 1989). 
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of a four-month suspension of lawyer Peek for misconduct based in large 
part on his chronic depression.170  The court conditioned the stay on a two-
year probationary period during which Peek would have to receive mental 
health counseling.171 
Likewise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court dealt with a lawyer diagnosed 
with anxiety and depression that caused his practice to suffer.172  Testimony 
from a psychologist explaining the major depressive episode the lawyer 
suffered would likely not return with proper control and monitoring seemed 
to convince the court to temper discipline.173  Thus, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court conditioned Loew’s resumption of practice on maintaining 
a therapeutic relationship with a psychiatrist for five years post-
reinstatement of the attorney’s practice.174  Given conceptual benefits the 
courts see in aiding those lawyers already afflicted with mental health 
conditions, preventative measures will only further serve the goal of 
protecting the profession and clients.   
Granted, an endeavor such as requiring lawyers to submit to mental 
health screenings is highly aspirational in nature.  It entails a great deal of 
cost and organization, more than likely foisting additional responsibilities on 
state bars.  In the past, the Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to utilize a 
mental health counseling requirement for an attorney to return to practice, 
reasoning the adverse effects a reported relapse would have on the lawyer’s 
probation would prove detrimental; instead the court opted for voluntary 
counseling.175  Still, the Oklahoma court tacitly admitted the value of 
therapeutic relationships in managing the stressors and aggravating factors 
on lawyers’ mental health.176  Rather than disbar an attorney for his work-
related anxiety and depression, this court saw the value in continuing to 




170. Id. at 634. 
171. Id. 
172. See In re Loew, 780 N.W.2d 523, 527–28 (Wis. 2010) (describing attorney Loew’s mental 
state and the impact of his mental state on his practice). 
173. See id. at 528 (recommending a sixty-day suspension and restrictions on the attorney’s 
resumption of his practice proposed by a licensed psychologist). 
174. See id. at 529 (requiring semi-annual reports from the lawyer’s physiatrist regarding the 
status of the lawyer’s mental health and management of symptoms). 
175. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Townsend, 277 P.3d 1269, 1281 n.50 (Okla. 2012). 
176. See id. at 1280–81 (crafting conditions while availing to notions acknowledging the rigors 
associated with solo practice as it relates to anxiety and depression). 
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monitoring the lawyer’s mental health.177  
When a lawyer allows a mental health condition to go unacknowledged 
and unchecked, there is a higher likelihood of severe consequences.178  
Procedures in place to actively monitor the mental health of lawyers creates 
the possibility of catching instances when mental health conditions go 
unchecked.  The lawyer, the client, and the profession arguably benefit 
under this system.  
With a steadily increased focus on the mental health of practicing lawyers, 
bold and aspirational advances are necessary to continue to change the 
negatively stereotyped culture associated with lawyer mental health 
conditions.  Providing lawyers with a constant update on their mental health 
status will better effectuate the provisions of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) insofar 
as it would inform lawyers about their current mental health status and 
hopefully grant lawyers information on how to deal with mental health 
conditions.  The lack of definition regarding what constitutes a mental 
condition under Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) leaves anxiety, depression, and 
bipolar disorder within the realm of possible qualifying conditions.  These 
same conditions are also detectable if this mandatory scheme is adopted.   
B. Making Depression, Anxiety, and Bipolar Disorder Mitigating Factors in 
Disciplinary Proceedings 
Another course of action the ABA and state bar associations can take is 
to specifically make common mental health conditions like depression, 
anxiety, and bipolar disorder mandatory mitigating factors in imposing 
discipline for lawyers accused of violating Model Rule 1.16(a)(2).  The 
guiding principle and purpose of disciplining lawyers is not to punish the 
lawyer but to protect the public; some courts, however, view the sanction as 
a signal to other lawyers that such conduct is intolerable.179  However, when 
courts punish lawyers already suffering mental health conditions, they are 
effectively punishing the victim for a mental health condition the lawyer 
 
177. See id. (recommending the attorney “be disciplined by public reprimand” and encouraging 
the attorney continue regular meetings with a therapist). Contra In re Sherman, 404 P.2d 978, 983 (Wash. 
1965) (Rosellini, C.J., dissenting) (advocating suspension of an attorney and drawing an analogy 
between a lawyer practicing with the “handicap” of mental illness with a doctor suffering from palsy 
practicing surgery). 
178. See In re Murrow, 336 P.3d 859, 863, 866 (Kan. 2014) (noting a lawyer suffered severe 
depression for years prior to its climax, which resulted in a violation of the state equivalent to Model 
Rule 1.16(a)(2)). 
179. Att’y. Grievance Comm’n v. Wallace, 793 A.2d 535, 542–43 (Md. 2002) (examining the 
purpose underlying attorney discipline). 
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never wanted.  It is time to reevaluate the effectiveness of discipline in 
relation to lawyer mental health.180   
The difficulties involved in disciplining lawyers with mental health 
conditions is brought to the fore in the pre-Model Rules case of In re 
Sherman.181  Lawyer Sherman was charged with incompetently representing 
clients while suffering a personality disorder that caused him to lose control 
of his emotional stability.182  The majority opinion expressed reservation 
regarding disbarring Sherman simply for his having such a mental health 
condition, especially considering the treatable and manageable nature of the 
condition.183  In lieu of disbarment or suspension, the court saw the best 
course of action would be to allow the otherwise capable lawyer to continue 
to practice once treatment for his condition was complete.184   
Since Model Rule 1.16(a)(2), as analyzed in this Comment, is based on a 
lawyer’s mental condition that materially impairs their ability to represent their 
client, allowing such a mental condition to be a mitigating factor in attorney 
discipline seems counterintuitive.  However, in its Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions, the ABA has already proposed “mental disabilit[ies]” as a 
permissive, but not a mandatory, factor in mitigating discipline.185  Crafting 
these standards was an effort to promote uniformity in disciplining lawyer 
misconduct; they are relied upon to some degree even though they are not 
binding on state disciplinary bodies.186  Abolishing the mental health 
provision of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) is unlikely considering its staying power 
through the Model Rules variations, but emphasizing treatment and 
rehabilitation is preferable to continued discipline.  
Indeed, some states do use the presence of a mental health condition as 
a mitigating factor.  The Kansas Supreme Court, in In re Murrow,187 handed 
 
180. See Page Thead Pulliam, Lawyer Depression: Taking a Closer Look at First-Time Ethics Offenders, 
32 J. LEGAL PROFESSION 289, 294–95 (2008) (taking issue with the appropriateness of continuing to 
use the limited means available in traditional disciplinary sanctions to treat lawyer mental health 
problems).  
181. In re Sherman, 404 P.2d 978 (Wash. 1965). 
182. Id. at 978, 980. 
183. Id. at 980–81. 
184. See id. at 982 (providing for voluntary treatment for mental health conditions prior to 
allowing an attorney to return to practice). 
185. ABA STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER 
SANCTIONS (1992).  
186. See Todd Goren & Bethany Smith, Depression as a Mitigating Factor in Lawyer Discipline, 
14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1081, 1085–86 (2001) (considering the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions, which consider chemical dependency and mental disabilities potential mitigating factors). 
187. In re Murrow, 336 P.3d 859 (Kan. 2014) 
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down a one-year suspension for a lawyer found in violation of several state 
equivalent Model Rule provisions, including 1.16(a)(2).188  After a diagnosis 
of severe depression requiring medication, psychotherapy, and several 
medical leaves of absence, lawyer Murrow missed deadlines causing 
prejudicial outcomes for his clients’ cases.189  Murrow’s doctor linked the 
severe depression to his law practice, yet implied, in his letter dated 
January 15, 2014, Murrow could potentially successfully recover and return 
to practice after a hiatus from practicing law and proper treatment.190   
Instead of taking a dismissive view towards the lawyer’s mental health like 
one trial court judge,191 the Kansas Supreme Court granted reinstatement 
provided the lawyer “received adequate health treatment, including 
psychological treatment, and has been medically and psychologically 
evaluated and determined fit to engage in the active practice of law.”192  
Importantly, the violation of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) was deemed a direct 
result of Murrow’s suffering from depression.193  Rather than punish 
Murrow for this fact, the court allowed him to return to practice, provided 
he took the necessary steps to rehabilitate his mental condition.  This 
alternative is preferable to enforcing sanctions against lawyers already 
suffering from mental health conditions.194   
Using the mental health of a lawyer in mitigating a violation of Model 
Rule 1.16(a)(2) should become mandatory and adapt to the current 
situations facing lawyers.  In many cases, state supreme courts using mental 
health as a mitigating factor must consider whether there is a causal nexus 
between the misconduct and mental impairment.195  The requirement 
essentially prohibits considering the mental health of a lawyer in mitigation 
 
188. See id. at 869–70 (conditioning reinstatement to active practice upon receiving treatment 
for his mental health conditions).  
189. See id. at 861, 863 (providing an example of a case where the lawyer missed deadlines and 
providing letters from the lawyer’s physician outlining the details of the lawyer’s mental illness). 
190. See id. at 863–64 (“As to [Murrow’s] potential return to the practice of law; only time will 
tell.”). 
191. See id. at 869 (quoting Judge Vano’s comments on the record: “[Murrow] may, in fact, have 
an illness, but he also has a responsibility to his client”). 
192. Id. at 870.  
193. See id. at 867 (finding the lawyer’s personal and emotional problems a mitigating factor in 
considering discipline for the lawyer). 
194. See Pulliam, supra note 180, at 301 (arguing the use of harsh disciplinary sanctions against 
depressed lawyers will deter treatment).  
195. See Kristy N. Bernard & Matthew L. Gibson, Professional Misconduct by Mentally Impaired 
Attorneys: Is There a Better Way to Treat an Old Problem?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619, 624 (2004) 
(discussing the use of mental impairment as a factor in mitigation).  
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unless the lawyer proves his mental health was a direct cause of the 
misconduct.196  However, this causal requirement ignores the reality that 
any lawyer suffering a mental health condition like depression, anxiety, or 
bipolar disorder is continually operating under a hindrance.  Whether 
conscious of it or not, lawyers suffering from mental health conditions have 
their daily lives colored in front of this backdrop.  Consideration of this fact 
informs the view that mental health should be considered a mitigating factor 
in disciplining lawyers for violating Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) regardless of 
proof of a causal connection. 
As at least one commenter has posited, completely removing a lawyer 
with a treatable mental condition from the legal practice seems to serve 
neither the public nor the practice.197  Amending the Model Rules to 
include a minimum amount of psychiatric therapy sessions ensures lawyers 
keep the ever-present stress associated with the legal profession from 
manifesting into full-blown anxiety or depression.  Like the minimum hour 
requirements aimed at maintaining competency among legal professionals, 
a requirement ensuring a lawyer maintain his or her mental health will serve 
to protect clients from the repercussions of having a lawyer practicing with 
a mental health condition materially impairing the lawyer’s ability.  
Further, easing the disciplinary burdens imposed by Model 
Rule 1.16(a)(2) will hopefully shift the focus from disciplining lawyers for 
their mental health conditions to encouraging rehabilitation and treatment.  
Concomitantly, these two recommendations will serve to alleviate the 
burden on lawyers having to deal with the unworkable situation Model 
Rule 1.16(a)(2) presents. 
V.    CONCLUSION 
The guiding light of the legal profession is—and rightfully should be—
lawyers acting in the best interests of their clients to effectuate their clients’ 
legal goals.  However, as the understanding of mental health conditions like 
anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder increases, the legal profession must 
continue to address the outsized instances of these mental health conditions.  
The mandatory duty to withdraw or forgo representation when a lawyer 
 
196. See In re Kurtz, 580 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (declining to use a lawyer’s 
personal health problems in mitigation absent a showing of a causal nexus between the misconduct 
and the health condition); Fla. Bar v. Clement, 662 So. 2d 690, 699–700 (Fla. 1995) (refusing to 
acknowledge a lawyer’s bipolar disorder as a factor in mitigation).  
197.  Bernard & Gibson, supra note 195, at 627–28. 
  
142 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 11:108 
suffers a mental health condition is twice enforced against lawyers—once in 
the state-adopted versions of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) and again in the 
precedents set in state supreme court decisions, as they serve as the ultimate 
arbitrators of attorney discipline in their jurisdictions.   
With the increase of Lawyer Assistance Programs providing lawyers with 
the tools to protect themselves and their clients from the crippling effects 
of these diseases, lawyers have unclear and often unworkable duties under 
the Model Rules.  If the legal profession is earnest in its desire to combat 
mental illness, certain changes must occur in how lawyers with mental health 
issues are treated.   
Rather than punish lawyers laboring within the ill-defined standards 
under the Model Rules, disciplinary bodies should increase deference to 
lawyers suffering these mental health conditions that often arise from 
practicing law.  Additionally, the ABA should consider amending the Model 
Rules to include a mandatory provision for lawyers to receive mental health 
treatment before continuing to practice law.  Not only will a change 
requiring lawyers to receive periodic checkups on their mental health save 
lawyers from harming their client’s interests, it will also improve the 
functioning of the Model Rules as lawyers can more actively understand 
their situation rather than leave the issues to fester.   
Bold changes like these at the level of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct are the best course of action.  Due to the Model Rules’ 
influential nature to spark uniform change throughout the states, changing 
the Model Rules presents a preferable alternative to piecemeal adoption at 
the state level.  The amount of latitude vested in state courts to interpret the 
ambiguous nature of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) is a concept difficult to contend 
with if, indeed, a nationally uniform system of professional conduct is 
preferable. 
With stare decisis binding state supreme courts to antiquated notions of 
mental health, increased sympathy and a more robust understanding of 
mental health conditions today must grapple with these past sentiments.  
The pattern of accepting mental health conditions as legitimate when 
explained by underlying physical difficulties is evidence of the possible 
shortcomings of waiting for courts and the ABA to slowly overturn 
precedent.  Some progress is preferable to none, but this problem is worthy 
of a nudge in the right direction.   
To date, lawyers’ primary professional duties towards clients have taken 
precedence even when balanced against lawyers’ physiological and 
psychological health.  If the legal profession is serious in its desire to treat 
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the wide-reaching mental illnesses in the legal profession without shutting 
out a large proportion of current and aspiring practitioners, it is time to shift 
the calculus slightly in favor of lawyers.  Changing the terms by which 
lawyers navigate their professional duties under Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) and 
its precedent are potential starting points. 
